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Summary2
The basic architecture worldwide of financial safety nets provides for  a system of similar institutions:
a lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and prudential regulation.  The nature of the banking systems,
resolution methods, and prudential regulation that the safety nets backstop does differ across important banking
markets, but prudential regulation is converging as a result of the crises of the 1980s and 1990s to the model
of consolidated regulation, strict capital requirements, and similar accounting principles. The safety nets and
the detailed mechanisms of their operation can be functional in those banking systems whose banks have value
in that they enhance existing incentives to reduce excessive risk-taking resulting from moral hazard.  In
countries whose banking systems suffer seriously from negative capital positions and overbanking such as in
some Latin American markets, these formalisms of the safety net may not be functional in reducing excessive
risk taking because of the strong incentive to banks to double their bets for survival.  Thus, the first order of
business has been to eliminate the negative capital positions of the banks through capital injection, liquidation,
and merger.  The hole has been filled for now with the injection of government paper, part of which is expected
to be financed through the rising revenues of anticipated economic recovery.  A recovery would also restore
some value to non-performing assets and thereby reduce the problem.
Pending a recovery, the role of the safety net has been to restrict growth in the troubled banks to
prevent an echo of the crisis in the next few years until the public finances and the courts can eliminate
the problem. In the meantime,  some financial safety nets and banking industrial organizations have
been adjusted to account for the lessons of the recent crises. These changes are two-edged swords.
 In many markets, restrictions have been removed on the entry of foreign banks to bring more capital
and liquidity  into the system and to improve risk control methods.  The downside may be to force
domestic banks to take riskier positions to maintain market share.  In one country, a private deposit
insurance scheme has been implemented to calm small depositors; the downside may to create more
moral hazard and increase the likelihood that small depositors will test their banks.  Finally, efforts are
underway to make interbank markets more liquid, thereby making it easier to operate the lender of last
resort service; as a negative effect this may allow banks to mobilize newly liquid securities as collateral
in the construction of risky leveraged positions.  I. Goals of a Financial Safety Net  and Basic Safety
Net Architecture
A financial safety net is a government orchestrated set of principles and operating policies aimed at
preventing large disturbances from propagating through  the system of financial intermediation between savers
and investors.  Such disturbances can arise because many claimants on the financial system lack information
about the quality of investments backing their claims and hold claims in a highly liquid form relative to assets.
 The nature of the financial system can, in extraordinary circumstances, lead to runs on troubled institutions,
contagion effects on other institutions, problems in making payments,  losses to third parties, and other
externalities that can be prevented, in theory, at relatively low cost.  Disturbances external to the financial
system can also be magnified if  they adversely affect the solvency of the system.  Thus, over the course of
time, institutions of a financial safety net--lenders of last resort, prudential regulation, deposit insurance, and
resolution schemes--have emerged to protect the capital of financial institutions and to avoid sudden
disintermediation. 
The financial system is in the business of efficiently allocating the savings of a society to profitable
investment whose payoffs are sufficient to back the promises of the financial institutions in most economic
outcomes.  To assure the proper allocation of investment over the course of time, institutions that fail to invest
well enough to service their liabilities while generating adequate returns to shareholders should be removed
from the financial industry through failure or liquidation, leaving  the liability holders to bear the consequences
as in any other industry.  In this way, owners and management will most likely make proper investment
decisions. 
Of its nature, a financial safety net tends to undermine the accountability of the owners, managers, and
other claimants on a financial institution by generating moral hazard: owners, managers, depositors, and
borrowers from financial institutions can gain from taking riskier positions than they would otherwise, unless the
safety net is cleverly constructed.  The financial system can then become more prone to crisis than in the
absence of  a safety net, requiring frequent costly interventions. 
To accommodate this tension between moral hazard and avoidable externalities,  financial safety nets
are carefully crafted mosaics whose pieces, in the best of worlds, should subtly fit together to push banks to
behave ideally as if there were no safety net while still eliminating the externalities from the financial system.3
 Thus, we see very detailed prudential regulations that accompany lender of last resort facilities and deposit
insurance and that are designed to constrain the outcome of portfolio decisions of financial institutions to what
they would choose without subsidized liquidity support or deposit insurance.  No system, however, is perfect;
and the system that emerges in a particular country can be interpreted as a reflection of an assessment of and
balancing between the likely costs from the negative externalities of a collapsed system and the long term mis-
allocation  of capital in an overly protected system.  The consensus view on which type of loss is worse tends
to depend on the outcome of the most recent crisis.
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In practice, in a broad spectrum of countries, we can observe that prudential regulations have either
been  weak on paper or poorly enforced, most often because of the political power of the parties associated
with the financial system.  Troubled institutions have often been bailed out or resolved without visiting the costs
as promised on the principal decision-makers and claimants on the institutions.  Thus, political infeasibility
makes the carefully structured mosaic of regulation and resolution more of a fiction than a reality as a means
of establishing proper incentives.
                                               
1For example, Calomiris (1996) argues that losses from bailouts are very large: the cost of the U.S. S&L bailout exceeded in
real terms the direct costs of bank failures during the Great Depression, the Venezuelan bailout cost 16 percent of GDP in 1994, the
Hungarian banking bailout cost 10 percent of GDP, and in Finland and Norway the bailouts cost 8 percent of GDP.  He takes the position
that the costs of a financial safety net generally exceed the gains from having it.  However, it is usually the fear of the potential for a big
depression that provides the ultimate economic rationale for an extensive safety net rather than the calculus of the direct losses in the
banking systems.
However damaging they may be, incomplete or weakly enforced regulations are not sufficient to lead
to systemic financial problems.  Problems occur when management of financial institutions  generally has a
strong incentive to take unusual risk. Such incentives exist when there is little actual capital or little franchise
value in an institution. Especially in eras of liberalization and financial innovation, financial institutions tend to
lose value because of increased competition, and there is a need to rationalize the system through closures
or mergers.  If these changes cannot be arranged, aggressive institutions will expand in contests for market
share.  It is no coincidence that difficulties in establishing effective financial safety nets have been so
widespread--the need to rationalize the financial system of each country is a natural outcome of the
globalization of markets.  Given the incentive, financial institutions readily have found ways to circumvent the
spirit of prudential regulations, leading to the sequence of banking failures observed across numerous
economies in the 1980s and 1990s, regardless of the level of economic development.  Banks without value are
a locus of expansion and collapse.
II  Restructuring the Safety Nets in Latin American
The catastrophic Latin American exchange market and financial crises of the 1980s, which resulted
in underinvestment and slow or negative growth for most of the decade, brought to the forefront of economic
policy-making a much more conservative, technically oriented leadership by the early 1990's.  These were
committed to several basic principles: that the inflationary finance that had been utilized was in itself a
devastating problem rather than a useful expedient and to be avoided even at large cost and that the4
institutional structure of private and fiscal finance had to be radically changed.  Furthermore, the ongoing
government deficits, to the extent that they were not funding clearly profitable infrastructural investment were
to be eliminated.  This view led to the market liberalization and privatization that was the remarkable feature
of many LA economies in the first half of the 1990s.
In concrete implementation, these principles were not prominent in the 1980s in most developing and
industrial countries and still are not used in many important financial centers.  The  Latin American experience,
however, indicated that the cost of not adhering to these principles, at least in the context of the 1980s, was
immense.  Thus, we have seen some implementation of them in the crises of 1994 and 1995.
The ultimate goals for a safety net are not controversial, and the methods of operating a financial
safety net are generally understood.  Most countries are converging to formally similar systems of deposit
insurance and prudential regulation.   However, in the Latin American context-- Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Venezuela in particular-- the effectiveness of a movements toward internationally standard systems is
problematic because of the difficulty in filling the negative capital positions in the financial institutions.
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2Unfortunately, I will focus on these squeaky wheels rather than on those systems that did not pass through crises in the
1990s, such as Chile or Colombia.  Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995) discuss how non-inflationary macro policy coupled with a priority
of resolving the problem banks from the crisis of the early 1980s established a sound banking system in Chile in comparison to those of 
Mexico and Argentina.
This paper will examine several aspects of this convergence.  To establish a baseline, the paper will
review the current status and transitional plans of financial safety nets in countries that have recently
experienced financial crises--Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil--but it will concentrate on analyzing some effects
of various efforts to establish soundly financed safety nets and soundly capitalized  banks.  It will also consider
whether reforms themselves may lead to increased efficiencies and sources of profit that may finance at least
part of the transition cost and the extent to which financial systems open to international competition on a retail
level can themselves make up for past losses without losing business to foreign competitors.  Part of the
exposition will be devoted to the pitfalls that will emerge as a result of efforts of insolvent entities to avoid the
tightening prudential regulations  and as a result of efforts to adjust various aspects of the safety net.
III. Interior Decoration of the Architecture: Type 1 vs. Type 2  Errors in Bank Resolution5
Inside the general architecture of the safety net, decisions must be made about what to do with
institutions that do get into trouble.  In this context two errors of policy can occur.  The first can be labelled a
Type 1 error--the liquidation of a bank when it is basically solvent, has franchise value, and should remain open.
 In a Type 2 error, an insolvent bank  with no franchise value is not liquidated.  As part of the interior design
within the basic architecture of the safety net, supervisors must establish the operating principles for the
resolution of troubled banks depending on their perceived probabilities and tastes for each type of error.  They
can establish principles under which they will quickly intervene and close insolvent banks to avoid type 2 errors
at the cost of closing many solvent institutions.   Excessive zealousness in closing down institutions can lead
to an exacerbation of the problem, even causing sound institutions to collapse in the standard liquidity crisis fire
sale.  Alternatively, they can operate so that they rarely liquidate a solvent bank at the cost of keeping open the
doors of  many misbehaving, insolvent institutions.  Indeed, the resolution principles may in turn dictate the basic
architecture of the system.
3
                                               
3For example, the pre-Tequila Argentine system was a signal that troubled banks might have difficulty finding liquidity support
or protection against bank runs that a deposit insurance scheme might have offered.  This reflected the priority of preserving the
exchange parity, but it also indicated a willingness to sacrifice even potentially solvent banks.
Resolutions of banking problems have varied in nature across countries, especially in terms of their
ultimate costs. In most cases, however, the resolution process has been protracted, even in countries where
banks have been rapidly closed, for even in those cases the process has still to play itself out in the courts.
In the interim, most countries have implemented policies of rolling the problem into the future on the
assumption that part of the problem is a liquidity issue associated either with a business cycle or with an
excessive pessimism on the part of  the banks' creditors.  Delaying resolution has the benefit of separating
by hindsight those banks for which the problem is temporary from those that are effectively insolvent--i.e. of
avoiding a type 1 error.   The cost  is that insolvent entities continue to function and to run up additional losses,
and this type 2 error effectively subsidizes the insolvent banks, perhaps generating capital problems for the
previously solvent institutions  The incentives then drive even the solvent banks to take increased risk.
This tension causes authorities to take a stand on one side or the other on the rapidity of bank closures.
Each authority develops its own sense of what its operating principles should be, depending on its own
experience.  If the results of past banking crises indicate that the banking system was forced to consolidate
excessively, then the operating principal will be to keep the banking system from shrinking too rapidly in the next
crisis.  Thus, the system will have  extensive deposit insurance schemes, capital injection schemes, and heavy
regulation of the banking and financial system to protect it from competitors from either onshore or offshore
and also to prevent it from taking excessively risky positions. 
If there was no protracted economic downturn associated with a previous banking crisis or if the
financing to carry the banking system into the next growth phase is difficult to obtain,  then the operating
principal will dictate less of an intervention into the banking system, perhaps even an extensive closure and
consolidation of the banks with depositors bearing the costs.6
This sort of solution is most palatable to free market economists who take a dim view of government
intervention because of the moral hazard issues.   Therefore, one can readily place oneself on the side of virtue
by espousing such principles.
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4Typically, though, the embrace of virtue stems from necessity and the difficulty of finding a lender.
What might be interpreted as permanent  and universal principles of safety net operation really stem
from the ephemera of the moment, but  they establish themselves in the operation of the regulatory system for
years or decades after the initial crisis.  Nevertheless,  they may be unsuitable for the next crisis.
IV.  The Industry Standard Safety Net7
The most common structure for a financial safety net is to assure  extensive facilities for liquidity
provision, to provide deposit insurance with relatively high limits per account, and to allow insured banks to
undertake a wide range of potentially risky business.
5   The system that existed in Argentina at the time of the
Tequila crisis--with limited liquidity provision because of the currency board nature of the foreign exchange
policy and no deposit insurance--is a counter-example to the basic model.
6
Within the standard safety net structure, supervision and regulation and intervention strategies differ
radically.  Before the 1990s, supervisory intervention was not triggered until a troubled bank=s capital fell to zero,
which, in practice meant that the bank was seriously insolvent because of lax enforcement of the categorization
of non-performing loans and loan loss provisions.  Taking Basle-type capital standards seriously has meant
                                               
5At the time of the banking problems in the U.S. in the late 1980s, the old Chicago school prescription of narrow banking--in
the guise of the provision of deposit insurance only to institutions that hold essentially riskless, short maturity paper--was briefly
resurrected.  The idea was to insure only those institutions with direct access to the payment system and inform depositors in all other
institutions that their deposits were uninsured.  An immediate objection is that the uninsured part of the banking system would be returned
to being prone to bank runs by depositors and the associated credit contractions, a problem that was so severe in the Great Depression
that it generated the current system of extensive deposit insurance.  Indeed, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) praise the provision of
deposit insurance as a key institutional change in the stabilization of  the supply of money.  A second problem is that the banks at the
heart of the payment system are the key providers of daylight and overnight credit to the financial system.  Barring them from credit
provision to private borrowers would significantly raise the costs of many liquidity-hungry institutions such as futures markets and perhaps
eliminate the business.
6With its provision in 1995 of limited deposit insurance--albeit private--Argentina has moved closer to the standard structure.8
that regulatory intervention will now occur at an earlier stage of insolvency.
7   Of course, the definition of  the
amount of regulatory capital on a bank's balance sheet depends on the power and determination of supervisors
and on the nature of the prudential regulations in effect, and these also differ across countries.
                                               
7For example, the powers granted to U.S. regulators under FDICIA allow them to intervene strenuously while bank capital is
still positive.  Whether they will do so in practice and not be deterred politically has yet to be tested because fortuitously banks have been
highly profitable since the law=s passage.  For example, the powers granted to U.S. regulators under FDICIA
Many systems lack explicit deposit insurance, although it is clear that depositors expect either bailouts
of the banks or ex post insurance protection in the event of a liquidation.  Alternatively, very limited deposit
insurance may be explicitly offered.  Most often, such systems impose lifeboat schemes in which solvent banks
are organized to take over insolvent institutions by Ministries of Finance or supervisory authorities, with the cost
distributed among the remaining banks according to some formula that the regulators may determine on an
ad hoc basis.  Sometimes the costs can be made up later to the acquiring party through quiet regulatory
forbearance on competitive or other matters.  In France and Japan, such resolution methods were
commonplace until recently.
V. Prudential Regulation: The Architecture's Mechanicals
  Prudential regulations are well-accepted as a method to avert the moral hazard problems that arise
in the operation of most financial institutions.   These institutions needs certain guidelines and supervision to
protect their claimants.  The ultimate claimant in many banking institutions is a deposit insurer, whether  implicit
or explicit, which itself leans on the fiscal authority to back its guarantees.  The fiscal authority must protect itself
against excessive risk-taking by the insured institution.
Prudential regulations may take several organizational forms.  They may be rigid, effectively consisting
of a code that bars any operation of the financial institution that is not explicitly allowed. Alternatively, authorities
may work from a different principle in which financial institutions can do anything that is not explicitly prohibited,
subject to taking reasonable precautions to avoid excessive risk.  This is generally a more liberal environment,
but it imposes on the authorities a responsibility to assure,  by mounting an extensive supervisory operation, that
banks are not taking on an overly risky exposure.  Rather than a simple regulatory operation that determines
whether or not a bank=s activity conforms literally to a particular set of rules, supervision  in a liberal environment
must make quantitative assessments of the nature of bank  risks.9
 Regardless of how rigid the rules are or how close the supervision is, however, it is always true that
certain banks  will fail.  The failures may occur one at a time, based on idiosyncratic  bank behavior; or they may
occur simultaneously throughout the banking system.    Almost always, bank failures signal a failure of
prudential regulation. The ability of regulators to carry out their task is regularly undermined by an inadequate
allocation of resources to the supervisors.  Problems may emerge for technical reasons such as a lack of a
good accounting or legal system that can see through complicated corporate structures and force a
consolidated accounting to prevent the hiding of bad assets in subsidiaries.  They may occur because there is
a lack of resources that limits on-site inspections or because the enforcement powers of the supervisor are
weak.
8  Often, the regulators are familiar with the details of the problems in the banks, but they are deterred
from exerting their formal powers by political pressure.
   Various restrictions can prevent the growth of the balance sheets of banks--reserve requirements,
capital requirements, direct regulation of the types of assets that banks can hold and the liabilities they can
offer, and prohibitions of excessive concentration of assets  or risks in particular sectors.  Thus, for instance,
a rule might prevent lending to the real estate sector in more than prescribed multiples of bank capital.  Also,
individual banks may be prevented from growing excessively fast.  To set the general culture of a bank and to
foster competence and honesty, fit and proper rules governing senior management and controlling owners are
imposed.  To assure adherence to minimum capital requirements, rules governing loan classification,
provisioning, and accounting standards are also established.
Such restrictions aim to avoid the standard trouble spots in a banking system.  It is usually considered
an early warning of bank problems for  a bank to expand too fast.  There is a limited amount of risk
management capacity in the bank--sudden expansions of loans must surely outstrip the ability to expand  risk
management, especially because the bank is probably taking on riskier clients.  It is usually regarded as an
early warning of bank problems when a bank lends in excess to a single borrower or sector of borrowers.  It
is generally regarded as a signal of a problem when management and owners self-deal.  All such activities can
be proscribed through regulation.  Nevertheless, the proscription of particular activities, of itself, is not adequate
to prevent problems in banks from arising from those very activities. 
                                               
8de Juan (1995) provides an extensive list of how the methods that supervisors possess to contain insolvency can readily fail. 
All the failures revolve around a lack of political will to enforce the regulations.  See also de Krivoy (1995) on the requirements for
supervision and regulation.10
Modern banks can readily avoid regulations either in a straightforward manner or by going offshore or
engaging in off-balance sheet activities, which violate the intent, if not the letter, of regulations.  To prevent this
kind of avoidance requires a stringent regulatory environment in which the supervisor can, through consolidated
supervision, reach through the bank and all corporate affiliates, onshore and offshore, to prevent the
circumvention of regulation.  In this regard,  banks may be precluded from owning entities not engaged primarily
in activities related to banking, from owning insurance companies, or from being owned by non-financial
industrial corporations.  Regulations can be circumvented in an extremely sophisticated manner, which requires
a sophisticated supervisor.
9   The supervisor must have the power to prevent various activities from being
undertaken and to remove officials and penalize or even close a bank  before the bank has generated a
negative capital position.
All these requirements for successful prudential regulation are truisms, and very frequently they appear
in the statutes authorizing the activities of bank supervisors.  The problem, of course, lies in the application of
these powers.  Closing down or stringently disciplining a bank is inherently a political act in all countries.  It is
usually relatively easy to close a small bank; to close a large bank requires much more assent from the political
authorities.  Political authorities tend to avoid closures and overregulation of banks because they rely on the
banks, first to undertake investment projects that are politically beneficial to them and second to use the banks
as funding mechanisms for  their own activities.  The banks can be used as a means of  providing
unappropriated expenditures to a particular region or sector from the fiscal authority.  Regardless of the nature
of the benefits or costs emanating from the banking system, this means that the banks have powerful political
protection that can subvert actions of the regulators. 
Ideally, the banking sector should channel its resources into that lending that is suitable for a banking
sector--relatively low risk, relatively liquid investment that can be made to generate cash in a short time to meet
cash demand from the liability holders.  If the claimants have cash demands denominated in foreign currency,
the investments must be able to generate quick payoffs or unlock credit lines in the foreign currency to meet
these demands.  In that way, an exchange crisis can be separated from a banking crisis rather than be closely
linked to it. 
                                               
9See Folkerts-Landau (1995), p.3.
  How do the various restrictions in the arsenal of prudential regulation channel capital?  Liquidity
requirements on banks define those liquid securities that qualify; if binding, this forces an increase in demand
for securities of those institutions whose paper is defined as liquid and reduces their funding costs.  Such
institutions then can increase their overall investment activity and shorten the maturity of their liability structure.
 If such institutions themselves are prudently run, they will indeed concentrate on projects that can be liquidated
quickly, so that the regulation will be effective in  enforcing a greater liquidity on the banking system.   If not, the
liquidity position of banks will prove to be a mirage in a crisis when the issuers of the securities cannot produce
quickly the demanded cash.  If the securities that satisfy liquidity requirements are government securities, this
lowers the cost of government funding.  Nevertheless, if the securities are to be mobilized in a liquidity crisis,
as is the purpose of a liquidity reserve, there must be a ready secondary or repurchase market for the
securities; otherwise, their purpose will be defeated through deep discounts.
Reserve requirements force the banking system to hold demand claims on the central bank in an
amount equal to some fraction of on-balance sheet deposits.  Together with a limitation on the expansion of
bank reserves,  reserve requirements control the on-balance sheet expansion of the banking sector.  Because
 deposits at the central bank generally pay zero or below market interest rates, an increase in reserve
requirements widens banking product spreads.  The increase in spreads leads either to a disintermediation to
financial institutions not subject to the requirement or to offshore banks, often affiliated with domestic banks.
Also, domestic banking institutions can avoid reserve requirements through the use of derivative products.11
Risk based capital requirements directly restrain the expansion on bank balance sheets of those assets
classified as risky; simultaneously, however, they tend to increase the riskiness of those assets that are held
in this category in order to cover extra capital costs.
10   When capital requirements are imposed, banks tend
to work against them through the definition of what constitutes capital.  This leads to a resistance to the
classification of loans as non-performing through restructurings or the capitalization of interest payments due
on old loans.  In turn, the funding of these rollovers forces deposit rates to be bid up and funds to be channeled
into losing projects.  Problem banks will then expand at the expense of sound banks.  Banks will also strive to
avoid marking losing securities  to market through market manipulations--for example, assets of the banks will
be held off the market so that market prices need not be recorded.   Activities that draw a risk-capital
requirement will also be driven off-balance sheet where they attract a lower requirement.  For example, an on-
balance sheet holding of equities might be converted into a swap or a structured note that is highly leveraged
but that has a relatively small capital requirement. 
A ban on holding securities on margin or on short sales will mean that equities holders will not be
forced to join the general scramble for cash in a liquidity crisis and thereby reduce the potential magnitude of
the demand for cash.  Such a ban reduces the liquidity of securities markets, thereby forcing up yields and
reducing their desirability as a source of funding.  This is desirable in  economies that are essentially illiquid--
security yields should reflect the degree of illiquidity.  Nevertheless, bans on margin buying  tends to push such
activity offshore, through over the counter derivative markets.
 VI.   Who Should Pay to Fill in the Negative Capital in Banks?
The list of candidates for covering the losses of failed banks is short: the taxpayer, the equity holders
and managers, the borrowers, and the depositors.  Inevitably, the taxpayer will directly pay for much of the loss
to the extent that the government bonds and other paper injected during the crisis and not repaid in the
liquidation of the insolvent banks are not monetized. The exigency of the crisis dictates that public credit initially
must paper over the problem, but the government can then reach out to recover part of the loss.   Who bears
the loss and who escapes are crucial determinants of expectations of what will happen in the next crisis and
therefore shape the nature of the moral hazard that will build up over the several years after the immediate
crisis is resolved.
                                               
10The Basle-type risk categories can also be used to determine varying risk-based premia for deposit insurance.12
The equity holders are natural candidates, having been best placed to determine the risk position of
failed bank.
11   In the absence of fraud, however, it is difficult to do more than strip the owners of their equity
in the bank.  This may be a poor disincentive--a risky bank can book high profits for years, thereby richly
rewarding its owners through dividends.  By self-dealing through complicated corporate structures, owners can
take even more from the bank, which they can send abroad.  It is notoriously difficult to recover much in civil
proceedings.  Especially with too-big-to-fail institutions, there often is an effort to bail out the bank with capital
injections, loan purchases, preferential access to central bank foreign exchange, or other concessions, which
leaves the original ownership in place. 
Smaller depositors are rarely forced to pay directly for the losses in the banks when there is deposit
insurance.
12  Thus, they have little incentive to act to control the behavior of banks through the withdrawal of
retail deposits.  Larger depositors generally can remove their funds before the collapse of a bank.  Indirectly,
                                               
11Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995) provide a set of principals by which resolutions should be undertaken in order to avoid
inflationary finance.  They propose three basic principals for such resolution: insure that parties that have benefitted from the risk-taking in
the loss generating institutions bear a large portion of the cost of restructuring, take prompt action to prevent the expansion of problem
institutions through credit expansion to risky borrowers and capitalization of interest due on outstanding loans, and give priority to the bank
restructuring by dedicating public revenues to extinguish the problem without inflation.
12Exceptions are the Mexdollar deposits of 1982 and the resolution of Argentine banking problems at the end of the
hyperinflation. 13
however, depositors can be made to pay for past losses if they are kept captive to the banking system through
restrictions on the provision of competitive products.
13   Banks can then widen their spreads and pay below
market rates on deposits: this will increase the profitability of banks and perhaps bring them back to solvency.
 Alternatively, it will allow them to pay the high insurance premia that may be required to restore deposit
insurance funds to solvency.  Finally, to the extent that depositors are captive to the banks, inflation can reduce
the real value of the loss to the system.  Going after depositors through forced restructuring of deposits or
inflation, however, creates a problem for the next crisis: instead of being passive bystanders, depositors will run
the banks and perhaps prematurely precipitate a liquidity crisis.
14 
                                               
13Efforts to liberalize financial systems and encourage competition imply that customers are now much less tied to their banks,
thereby releasing them from the ex post burden of paying for an insolvency.
14Small depositors, of their nature, aggregate to a large number of votes.  In the Rhode Island banking crisis of 1991, the state
initially resolved not to pay off depositors of the closed institutions.  This resolve crumbled when large numbers of well-dressed
octogenarian ladies were shown regularly on the news broadcasts hurling themselves in protest in front of the politicians= limousines at
Democratic Party rallies.
Efforts can be launched to make borrowers, whose defaults trigger the credit problems, repay their
debts.  In many countries, however, it is legally difficult to force payment or to seize the property of the
borrowers.  Even if it can be taken, the property serving as collateral will obviously have fallen below the amount
of the loan, although experience has shown that the eventual disposal of such property can pay for much of
the cost of resolving a bank.  The problem with collecting from borrowers is that their loss of collateral and
inability to acquire more credit will generally be associated with a severe economic downturn that may worsen
the current banking crisis.14
The resolution of a systemic crisis generally involves mergers and consolidation of what previously had
been an overbanked system.  Thus,  two additional potential sources of bank revenue can emerge in the
restructured banking system.  One arises from a reduction in competition that allows a widening of spreads for
borrowers and lenders, so that future bank depositors and borrowers can pay part of the cost of the resolution.
 The other arises from a rationalization of the production of bank services that permits a closure of branches
and a reduction of bank personnel.  To the extent that the increased revenue of the remaining banks can be
tapped, it can serve as an additional source of finance for the resolution costs.
15
VI. The Status of Banking Systems and Safety Nets in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil Mexico
The reprivatization of the Mexican banking system from June 1991 to July 1992 was accompanied by
 financial liberalization--removal of credit controls and reserve requirements, the free setting of interest rates,
and permission to offer US dollar denominated accounts and new financial products.
16  The reprivatization of
18 commercial banks  raised 38.6 billion new pesos (about $12 billion).  Banks were purchased at prices 2.2
 to  3.1 times book value. 
                                               
15One of the requirements for the injection of Norwegian government capital into the troubled banks was that they reduce their
operating costs.  See Drees and  Pazarbasioglu (1995) for details on the Nordic banking crises.
16For an analysis of the competitiveness of the Mexican banking system at the time of reprivatization, see Garber and
Weisbrod (1993).15
Buyers reportedly borrowed heavily to finance their purchases, and this launched the reprivatized
banks as revenue-hungry institutions.
17  Loans by Banamex grew by 40% in 1992, 48% in 1993 and 18% in
1993.  Loan growth for the other two large banks was similar, except that Serfin's loans grew by 27% in 1993,
a recession year.  For smaller banks like Banco Mexicano, loans tripled in the two year period, 1992-3.  The
expanding loans were accompanied by increasing fractions of mortgage and consumer lending in the loan
portfolio.  In addition, foreign currency loans amounted to 22% of the loan book.
Even before the crisis, the expanded loan book had been performing poorly. The percentage of past
due loans in September 1994 was 9.1%, 7.5%, and 9.7% for Banamex, Bancomer, and Serfin, respectively.
 Loss reserves for these banks were 46%, 37%, and 31%, respectively.  In addition, the Mexican banks had
taken large, unbalanced positions in the over-the-counter derivatives markets that would generate massive
demands for liquidity and further major losses in the crisis.
18
Prior to their sale, banks had been mainly lenders to the government, with their allocation of assets
decided through directed lending and through strict reserve requirements. After reprivatization, there was a
strong growth in private lending.  An ever-tightening supervisory system played catch-up with the banks  with
the adoption of the Basle capital  requirements and  stricter loan loss reserve requirements.  While Mexico was
                                               
17The three largest Mexican banks are Banamex, Bancomer, and Serfin, with shares of the deposit markets of 21%, 20%, and
13%, respectively, and similar shares of the loans markets. Risk weighted capital  in the three largest banks was 11.7%. 10.5%, and
8.9%, respectively, in September 1994.
18See Garber (1996) for details of these products.16
moving rapidly toward stronger supervision and regulation, the problems in the banks that became visible after
reprivatization led to speculative behavior that further weakened them.
19  Supervision and regulation was in the
midst of updating when the crisis overwhelmed it.   Apparently, the attempt  to liberalize the system and
simultaneously to construct  a regulatory apparatus to control it was too ambitious.
20  
21 
                                               
19Liquidity ratios in the six largest banks were 9.3 percent at the end of 1993 and 14.4 percent at the end of 1992.  For
Bancomer and Serfin, the end-1993 liquidity ratios were 6.4% and 4.3%, respectively, while for Banamex the ratio was 23%.
20The Banco de Mexico and the Comisión Nacional Bancaria supervise the banking industry, engaging in surveillance of credit
institutions, formulation of regulations, supervision, and the approval of banking officials.  The Comisión Nacional Bancaria has now
merged with the Comisión Nacional de Valores, the regulator of the securities markets.
21The required capital ratios are the Basle ratios of 8%.  As a departure from the normal Basle standards, 80% of revaluation
reserves of fixed assets and real estate subsidiaries could be included in Tier 1 capital.  This constituted 45% of total equity in 1994.
In previous banking crises, Mexico had protected both depositors and bank ownership, and the 1995
crisis was no exception.  The first response to the crisis was the  program of January 1995 to provide
temporarily some capital injections (PROCAPTE) to bring bank capital back to the Basle minimums, operated
by FOBAPROA, the deposit insurance fund.  In addition, a program to restructure some of the loans in the
banks was begun, and a part of the loan portfolio of the banks was bought by FOBAPROA, also with the intent
of recapitalizing the banks.  Losses from the purchased loans will be shared with the banks.  These
recapitalization and restructurings were funded through Banco de Mexico loans to FOBAPROA or with
government bonds.  FOBAPROA passed through the funds to the banks; and the funds were then redeposited
in frozen accounts in the Banco de Mexico.  Thus, to the extent that these loans are not repaid as the economy
recovers, they presumably will eventually be a charge on Hacienda.17
By the end of 1995, non-performing loans in the banking system amounted to about 98 billion new
pesos, about 12.2% of the loan portfolio.  Adding the 38 billion new pesos of loans acquired by FOBAPROA
in the last half of 1995, the amount of non-performings would have been 17 percent of the portfolio.  Six banks
have been intervened--five of them from the reprivatized banks of 1992; five banks had made use of
PROCAPTE;  and 13 banks had undertaken loan sales to FOBAPROA.  The total fiscal cost of these programs
was put at about 84 billion new pesos, about the dollar value of the proceeds from the reprivatization, or 5.5
percent of GDP by the end of 1995.
22
In the face of  this as yet unresolved problem, it is difficult to impose radical restructurings of the
financial safety net to address the failings that emerged in the crisis.  Nevertheless, even as the programs to
restore the capital of the banks have been implemented, some efforts to restructure the banking system have
been launched.  It is clear that the banking will have to be consolidated, so that within a few years only six to
nine of the eighteen reprivatized banks will remain.
23
                                               
22See Hacienda, "Consideraciones sobre la Evolucion del Sistema Bancario Comercial durante 1995", July 1996.
23The real value of loans in the portfolios of the commercial banks to the private sector fell by about 40 percent from December
1994 to April 1996.  The banks basically are in the business of trying to collect on old loans, and there has been a disintermediation as
commerce has resorted to an expansion of trade credit.18
A much less restrictive attitude vis-a-vis foreign banks has also emerged through regulatory and legal
changes.  Foreign banks were encouraged to increase their equity positions in Mexican banks in order to ease
the recapitalization problem.  For example, Probursa became an affiliate of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, and the
Bank of Nova Scotia took a 55 percent controlling interest in Inverlat.  Also, the Bank of Montreal bought sixteen
percent of the shares of Grupo Financiero Bancomer, the second largest banking group, and thirteen large
foreign banks were authorized to open banks in Mexico in 1995.  Legal changes were implemented allowing
foreign banks to increase their equity holdings in larger Mexican banks to 49% of equity, and foreign banks can
acquire Mexican banks whose capital is less than six percent of the system's capital.
24
The lesson absorbed by Mexican authorities is that, although it was rapidly coming to grips with a highly
risky banking system prior to the crisis, the regulatory structure did not evolve quickly enough in its powers or
in its information gathering ability to stem the crisis.  Thus, there is a movement to tighten the grip of supervisors
to prevent excessive risk-taking in the future.  Notable in this movement is the requirement that the banking
system transition to the more stringent categories of GAAP accounting by 1997.  Furthermore, the use of value-
at-risk methods to determine market risks and proper capitalization of such risks will be required in the second
half of 1996.
These are the sorts of supervision and regulation changes that one would expect if the basic outlines
of the financial safety net prescribe full deposit insurance and bailouts to banks and borrowers.  Tight
supervision is then the only way to avoid moral hazard.  Nevertheless, the presence of dead banks walking
serves as a continual threat that banks will circumvent regulations; those institutions that have poor future
prospects should be severely restricted in their ability to expand, on- and off- balance sheet.
Argentina
At the time of the Tequila crisis, the Argentine safety net was formally the least protective of bank
owners and depositors of the major financial systems in Latin America.  There was no deposit insurance and
the liquidity facilities that might be provided by the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina were limited. 
Furthermore, Argentina had a history of making depositors pay part of the cost of insolvent banks.  The high
capital requirements and the actual capital in the banks meant that the banks generally were strong enough
to withstand the liquidity test and high subsequent interest rates, at least initially.  The high liquidity requirements
provided banks a source of  ready cash to pay off depositors.
                                               
24See Hacienda, "Consideraciones sobre la Evolucion del Sistema Bancario Comercial durante 1995", July 1996, p. 20.19
The institutional organization of the safety net was such that the Argentine banking system responded
in a crisis in a manner reminiscent of the behavior of the pre-Federal Reserve US banking system.  Distrustful
depositors ran the weaker banks to pull out  about $8 billion, about 18% of the deposits in the system.  The
financial system as a whole, orchestrated in this case by the central bank rather than a private clearinghouse,
 had to mobilize the limited amount of  available reserves and distribute them among the banks.  For example,
the BCRA offset about $5 billion of the run through rediscounts and repurchase agreements to release its
excess foreign exchange holdings and by reducing reserve requirements.  The large liquidity holdings of the
banks themselves accounted for the rest of the cash withdrawals.  Some of the weaker small banks were
forced to close and were merged with the surviving banks.
25  
26  Ultimately, the fiscal cost of the banking crisis
                                               
25Forty five institutions were either merged or suspended, and new laws were passed to ease the takeover of troubled
institutions.  Also, two funds were created, one with funding from multilateral lenders to privatize provincial banks and one with funding
from the sale of Bonos Argentinos to support private banks and encourage mergers.
26IBCA (1996) has argued that some of the mergers were somewhat precipitate.  Stronger banks  purchased heavily
discounted loan portfolios from  the weaker banks so that they might have liquidity during the runs.   In the classical manner, the heavy
discounts in some cases changed a liquidity problem to a solvency problem. 20
was small, amounting to no more than one percent of GDP.
27  
28  Nevertheless, the banking system is still
having severe problems.
29
Argentines have expressed satisfaction with the behavior of their banking system and safety net in the
crisis, at least relative to the experience of the Mexican system.  Nevertheless, the subsequent sharp economic
downturn of the sort that is typical of  the aftermath of a pre-Fed banking crisis has been quite severe and has
been followed by the resurgence of a large fiscal deficit and an increase in non-performings.  This has been
interpreted as a bad equilibrium resulting from a liquidity crisis.
                                               
27The solvency of provincial banks is still problematic, but this was a recognized issue before the crisis.
28The Argentine banks may have been relatively stronger than the Mexican banks in part because they had had less time to
expand their balance sheets after the macroeconomic stabilization and because Argentine legal and tax restrictions had not yet been
reformed.  Therefore, Argentine banks had not moved into heavy use of the sort of derivative products that added to the losses and
liquidity problems of the Mexican banks.
29While there  has been a recovery in central bank reserves and bank deposits, the banking system is  still weak, with merged
institutions still showing losses.  Depositors have lost confidence due to the large amounts of remaining problem loans.  Banks are
staying liquid by placing funds into governments or large corporate securities.  See IBCA (1996).21
  Thus, in a sort of deja vu, there has been some effort to move away from this most laissez faire of
systems through  institutional changes aimed at ameliorating some of the harshest features of the system and
at reducing the chances of a similar crisis.  The changes amount to finding additional sources of liquidity for a
lender of last resort and providing some deposit insurance.   Since May 1995, banks have been required to
provide deposit insurance through a private, non-government guaranteed fund for sight deposits up to $10,000
and for  deposits maturing in more than ninety days up to $20,000.  Risk premiums charged banks are
determined according to Basle-type risk classifications.  To the extent that it is credible, this system is intended
to keep small depositors from participating in a bank run.
30  In addition, liquidity requirements have replaced
reserve requirements, with requirements at 16 percent against sight accounts and at lower percentages
depending on the maturity of the deposit claims.
31  Finally and most recently, the BCRA has invited high quality
international banks to offer it contingent repurchase agreements for Argentine dollar denominated securities--
that is, collateralized lines of credit--and has received offers for a total of about $7 billion of possible repos.  This
would allow the BCRA to mobilize  Argentine government securities received from banks in reverse repurchase
agreements to generate dollar liquidity.
 Brazil
                                               
30It is recognized that the deposit insurance fund will be insufficient to pay off large failures.  It is intended to keep depositors in
small institutions quiescent.
31The liquidity instruments can take the form of reverse repurchase agreements with the BCRA with Argentine government
dollar denominated bonds, letras de liquidez, which are government obligations placed in accounts maintained by the BCRA, or private
liquid securities held in custodial accounts managed by Deutschebank, New York, and domestic liquid securities along with a put option
for those securities on a high-quality foreign bank.22
The Brazilian banking problems are direct results of the distortion of the financial system during the
hyperinflation.  The implementation of the Real Plan in 1994 had served  either to unmask the insolvencies that
had accumulated in the system or to launch banks into risky operations to make up for lost inflation revenue.
32
 Thus, the Brazilian bailout and restructuring schemes primarily have been aimed retrospectively at liquidating
the distortions of inflationary finance, including the distorted industrial organization of the banking system. Welch
and Armstrong (1996) estimate the negative net worth of the system at about R$90 billion, of which about R$45
billion has already been funded by the Brazilian authorities through bond sales and injections.
33  The
restructuring of the system has involved the closing of many smaller banks and the takeover of some of the
larger ones by stronger institutions, although strong political pressures have delayed the resolution process.
34
 In the recent  period of relative price stability, banks lost a major source of revenues from their float operations,
which they attempted to offset with a rapid growth in lending instead of their previous intermediation of
government debt. As in Mexico and Argentina, there was a lack of a risk management culture in the banks,
which had yet to shift their human capital skills and systems to the problems of the new environment.   Thus,
                                               
32The discussion in this section is based on Welch and Armstrong (1996) and on various IBCA reports.
33 Most of the remaining problem is associated with the Caixa Economico Federal, a hole in the system that was generated
during the hyperinflation.  While this institution, part of the system of  funding housing construction has not done new business for 10
years, the loss cumulates at the rate of interest.  An ongoing difficulty stems from provincially owned banks, which have strong political
protection.
34Welch and Armstrong provide several examples of how difficult it is politically to impose such restructurings on the banking
system, a phenomenon also discussed in Rojas Suarez and Weisbrod (1995) and Calomiris (1996).23
loans in the banking system grew by about 50 percent in the second semester of 1994.  The credit squeeze
of 1995 triggered illiquidities in the weaker banks, which the authorities took as the opportune moment to
consolidate the system.
In response to the banking insolvencies, the Banco do Brasil acquired increased  power to lay the costs
of future problems on bank owners beyond simply the loss of invested capital.   In addition, to address the
problem of the excess capacity of the banking system, it developed a strategy of pushing for consolidation of
the system through merger and acquisition.
35  The central bank developed the PROER program for the
restructuring and strengthening of the financial system.  The subsidization of consolidation through this program
can strongly encourage expansion by small banks, which can suddenly become  almost too large to fail.  This
may create a future environment of excessive risk-taking.
36
                                               
35While there are many small banks, the banking industry is concentrated: the five largest banks control  55 percent  of bank
assets.  The next five largest banks control an additional fifteen percent. 
36See Welch and Armstrong (1995), pp. 6-7, who point to the case of the Banco Excel, which became large purely through the
acquisition of the assets of Banco Economico.
This points to a general problem in the industrial structure of those banks involved in the merger and
acquisition process.  Who will do the mergers and acquisitions?  Will it be the biggest banks, which already are
systemic in their risk, too big to fail, and the source of potential future problems.  Or will it be the medium sized
banks, whose managements see themselves as those that will be allowed to fail in the event of a solvency
problem.  If there is a benefit from being too big to fail, there will be a scramble by medium sized banks to grow
into too large to fail institutions, and they will pay excessive premia for the banks and assets thrown on the
markets.  Also, while the old management of the moribund banks may have been relatively conservative and
not inclined to play double or nothing, the management of acquiring banks will, of their nature, be much more
aggressive, a phenomenon observed in the early stages of the U.S. S&L crisis.
 VII. Some Steps toward Functional Safety Nets
Foreign Bank Capital 24
Once the initial problems of the banks are addressed so that the banking system at least reaches a
zero capital level, one can recapitalize the banks by allowing and encouraging foreign acquisition.
37   Even if
the acquisitions take the form of subsidiaries, typically there will be a close association of the parent with the
subsidiary.  Ideally, the parent bank will take steps to assure that the subsidiary will not run into solvency or
liquidity problems to preserve the reputation of the parent bank
38.  If a foreign bank appears in the form of a
branch, its own national deposit insurance may cover the risk to depositors.  Finally,  an additional set of
regulators, uninfluenced by local political concerns, will appear on the scene to examine the bank.  Of course,
the principal concern of these regulators is with the parent bank and not necessarily with the subsidiary; they
worry about the subsidiary only to the extent that it is excessively connected to the parent bank.  Indeed, foreign
regulators have the incentive of reducing excessive ties with the parent bank, so that  the subsidiary might have
to subsist on its own access to the market.
                                               
37Mexico has encouraged foreign banks to take over some of the smaller Mexican banks and has increased the amount of
equity in the larger banks that foreign banks may acquire.  Peru has privatized some large banks through foreign acquisition, and foreign
banks have also bought some of the private banks.  Although not driven by the recent crisis in other countries, Colombia privatized some
of the banks acquired during the crisis of the early 1980s into the hands of Venezuelan banks, and controlling shares in other private
banks were bought by international banks.    See e.g. Garcia-Cantera (1994, 1996). 
38Liquidity is not necessarily readily available, however.  During the Mexican crisis, some foreign private investors pulled funds
from Citibank, Mexico to reduce their Mexico exposure and forcing Citibank to sell the assets backing the deposits as they came due. 
Citibank, NY could have lent funds to carry the position until maturity, but it decided that it had already lent enough to its subsidiary, and
so forced a liquidation loss from a maturity mismatch. Citibank, NY  required its Mexico subsidiary to acquire liquidity on the market and
not through its parent.  Thus, Citibank, Mexico had to pay up to get funds.  On the other hand, short term funds were readily available in
Mexico to Citibank, Mexico because it was perceived as a higher quality, lower risk entity.  It could pay 4 percent less than Banamex or
Bancomer on deposits, but it  actually discouraged deposits because it did not perceive proper lending opportunities, even25
With immediate knowledge of the domestic banks, foreign subsidiaries may channel  extra liquidity in
times of crisis.
39  In addition, through their competitiveness and international experience, they can impose an
upgrade in the risk control systems and business practices of domestic banks.
On the downside, foreign banks may be less subject to domestic political pressures in their lending and
investment decision making.  It is a classic view that foreign banks tend to be cherry-pickers and leave the more
difficult retail markets to domestic banks.  Thus, they will strip the profitable wholesale domestic market, to the
extent that it still exists onshore, from the domestic banks and leave the risky lending to the domestic banks.
40
 Also, foreign banks, once in a market, are adept at using their international connections and expertise to pick
apart the domestic prudential and tax regulations to earn their profit.  They both push domestic banks into the
risky and speculative markets while simultaneously providing the operating tools for the domestic banks to
engage in such operations.   Of course, it is difficult to stop foreign banks from providing these tools--they can
always operate offshore and provide the same services to domestic banks while taking much of the wholesale
business of domestic banks in any case.
41
A further view of foreign banks is that they will often not channel capital toward those sectors that may
domestically be regarded as vital to the development of the domestic economy.  The domestic banking system,
by virtue of  regulators' control over charters and the possibility of regulatory abatement offered in return for
compliance, can encourage domestic banks to undertake such lending.  Foreign banks may be excessively
conservative and thereby reduce the amounts and direction of investment.  Domestic banking systems often
fall into problems because they have a wider ranging field of investment.   It may be better to have an
occasional crisis as long as capital can move in a direction that is more preferred by the national polity. 
                                               
39
 More likely, the risk control programs at corporate headquarters may require the foreign subsidiary to cut off liquidity lending to domestic
banks in a crisis--cutting back direct lending and even repos in a scramble to reduce counterparty risk.
40Foreign banks often serve the large domestic companies with significant international names.  Foreign banks generally take
such customers to the Euromarkets in medium term notes and Euro commercial paper. Trade finance and foreign exchange business
with large domestic corporates is also done offshore.  A foreign bank might have a small onshore balance sheet, but its operation in the
host country may support an offshore balance sheet that is four or five times larger.  Thus, staffs at foreign banks will generally be large
relative to their onshore balance sheets.
41See Garber and Weisbrod (1994) for an expansion of this argument.26
Capital injections from foreign banks into the banking system may be neither easy to obtain nor benign.
 In the presence of widespread insolvencies, foreign banks may fear that they will be assessed after their
investment  to pay for past failures along with the rest of the banking system.
42  Thus, they may hesitate to
undertake an onshore investment, preferring instead to operate their business with domestic institutions from
offshore. 
Finally, a sudden admission of foreign banking competition into a system with low capital can further
reduce the franchise value of domestic banks and lead later to a secondary crisis within a few years as
domestic banks compete to retain market share.  A drive for market share generally implies an underpricing
of products.  Only through a strict control on the expansion of the domestic banks can this secondary crisis be
avoided.
43  Supervisors will then appear to favor the newly arrived foreign banks, so control of the domestic
institutions may be problematic politically.
Developing Secondary Markets
A lack of liquid secondary markets for banking assets has severely restricted the operation of the safety
net.  Secondary markets do not function well for several reasons: a lack of legal standing for some market
operations, slow clearing and settlement systems for securities, and legal encumbrances on taking collateral
on defaulted loans.
                                               
42For example, in 1992, a ABN Ambro, having just set up a subsidiary in Paris was unexpectedly assessed by French
authorities according to an obscure formula, along with the rest of the banking system, to pay for the resolution of a failed French bank.
43 We can interpret the relatively strict system of Argentina as inviting a movement of business from  tightly restricted onshore
banks to offshore foreign owned banks or offshore subsidiaries of domestic banks.  The high liquidity requirements will serve to drive
wholesale business offshore, especially because of the unique ability to use dollars in payment of inter-business obligations.  All that is
required is a well-functioning payments channel to New York.  This will leave only middle market firms and small depositors in Argentina. 
Banks would then need only to do essentially cash business onshore. 27
Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995) argue that the institutional development of secondary markets in
assets and claims held by the banking system is desirable as a backstop to the resolution of troubled banks
and as a means to transition to a permanent safety net.
44   Making available the ability to market the assets of
failed institutions reduces the cost of the resolution and, indeed, makes more credible ex ante prescriptions to
resolve rapidly troubled institutions through liquidation.  Ready secondary markets imply that the supervisor can
finance much of the cost of resolution through quick asset sales and therefore needs to place less pressure
on scarce financial resources while liquidating the portfolios of closed institutions.  The actual closing of
institutions then becomes a viable threat and reduces the probability that troubled institutions will be merely be
bailed out through capital injections.  Costs can also be reduced because foreclosed assets  in the hands of
supervisors tend to depreciate rapidly. 
Although liquidity in many secondary markets cannot suddenly be created, hindrances to the
development of such liquidity can be removed.  For example, arranging for same day systems of settlement
of government and other securities can foster an overnight interbank repurchase market and smooth the
liquidity requirements of individual banks.  Same day settlement is also vital for the performance of a lender
of last resort role--central banks can receive instant delivery of dematerialized securities and can themselves
engage easily in repurchase operations with foreign banks to complete the chain of liquidity.  This is the
rationale behind the recent Argentine initiatives to streamline settlement and arrange credit lines with foreign
banks.  It is a logical fine tuning of the Argentine safety net architecture and makes less likely autonomous runs
in the Argentine banking system.
Liquidity in markets, however, is a two-edged sword.  Making assets readily available for liquidation in
an emergency also makes them available as good collateral in normal times.  Thus, banks can more easily
mobilize their liquid assets in establishing leveraged positions through offshore over-the-counter derivative
products.  Adverse market price movements can then trigger margin calls that quickly wipe out the liquidity
reserve.
45  The surveillance capacity of consolidated prudential regulation must then be augmented to detect
such operations.  This is not a trivial expansion, however; appropriate personnel may be difficult to obtain at
other than prohibitive cost because of the ever-evolving nature of such operations.
Private Deposit Insurance
                                               
44They recommend the establishment of the legal structures necessary for secondary markets to develop in the principal
assets held by banks.
45See Garber (1996) for a description of such a phenomenon in the Mexican crisis of 1994.
In fine tuning its financial safety net, Argentina has introduced a private deposit insurance scheme for
small deposits in which banks are required to participate.  Private deposit insurance schemes have a long and
fairly uniform history--they eventually fail.  A primary reason for their failure is that such schemes are generally
launched in limited  geographical markets or in situations in which the insurance principle cannot function.  For
example, most banking systems are heavily concentrated, with a few large banks and several dozen or more
smaller banks.  If any large bank fails, the insurance fund will be inadequate to cover the losses, so the deposit
insurance is not credible for depositors in the large institutions.  If a regional economic downturn occurs,28
numerous small banks may become insolvent, so the insurance is also not credible in this context.  Only in the
case of an idiosyncratic failure of a small number of small banks will the deposit insurance pay off.
Thus, the small banks have an incentive to take risk, unless they are controlled by the supervisor.  In
this context, the deposit insurer--i.e. the larger banks--will want to have the power to supervise the insured
institutions and to take regulatory action.  Thus, the large banks must have a strong voice on the board of the
insurer and in its management.  This means that the large banks may be able to use the insurance scheme
to thwart competition from the small banks.  Depositors in the large banks, in turn, must be implicitly guaranteed
by the government for the scheme to work in the event of a large bank failure.
Most private deposit insurance schemes provide for the assessment of remaining solvent members
in case the insurance reserves are exhausted.  This power often turns out to be illusory as members refuse to
deliver their liquid assets in the teeth of what surely will be a liquidity crisis.
Finally, a legal requirement to have deposit insurance in order to conduct a banking business may itself
cause a seizing up of the banking markets and a forced closure of the banks if the insurance fund is declared
insolvent. To prevent this, the government must inevitably intervene with funding.
For the scheme to be at all credible, it must involve a belief that the government will not permit the
insurance fund to become insolvent, which effectively makes it public deposit insurance.  The benefit of the
private scheme is that the  government need not reveal explicitly the extent of the guarantee that the depositor
may have.  Thus, small depositors may be less likely to precipitate a run than in the presence of no insurance
at all.  Alternatively, knowing that there is more moral hazard than in an uninsured system and knowing that
they may take large losses, depositors may be more likely to test the system.
VIII.  Conclusion
The basic architecture worldwide of financial safety nets provides for  a system of similar institutions:
a lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and prudential regulation.  The nature of the banking systems,
resolution methods, and prudential regulation that the safety nets backstop does differ across important banking
markets, but prudential regulation is converging as a result of the crises of the 1980s and 1990s to the model
of consolidated regulation, strict capital requirements, and similar accounting principles. The safety nets and
the detailed mechanisms of their operation can be functional in those banking systems whose banks have value
in that they enhance existing incentives to reduce excessive risk-taking resulting from moral hazard.  In
countries whose banking systems suffer seriously from negative capital positions and overbanking such as in
some Latin American markets, these formalisms of the safety net may not be functional in reducing excessive
risk taking because of the strong incentive to banks to double their bets for survival.  Thus, the first order of
business has been to eliminate the negative capital positions of the banks through capital injection, liquidation,
and merger.  The hole has been filled for now with the injection of government paper, part of which is expected
to be financed through the rising revenues of anticipated economic recovery.  A recovery would also restore
some value to non-performing assets and thereby reduce the problem.
Pending a recovery, the role of the safety net has been to restrict growth in the troubled banks to
prevent an echo of the crisis in the next few years until the public finances and the courts can eliminate the
problem. In the meantime,  some financial safety nets and banking industrial organizations have been adjusted
to account for the lessons of the recent crises. These changes are two-edged swords.  In many markets,
restrictions have been removed on the entry of foreign banks to bring more capital and liquidity  into the system
and to improve risk control methods.  The downside may be to force domestic banks to take riskier positions
to maintain market share.  In one country, a private deposit insurance scheme has been implemented to calm
small depositors; the downside may to create more moral hazard and increase the likelihood that small
depositors will test their banks.  Finally, efforts are underway to make interbank markets more liquid, thereby
making it easier to operate the lender of last resort service; as a negative effect this may allow banks to mobilize
newly liquid securities as collateral in the construction of risky leveraged positions.29
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